



BNP PARIBAS
FORTIS

| The bank for a changing world

Set up of an IMS Security Baseline

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Agenda

Introduction

Baseline setup

Summary



BNP Paribas Fortis

- Bank
- BNP Paribas
- Net profit : EUR 623 M (2013)
- Balance Sheet : EUR 261 B (2013)
- Employees : 15.320 FTE (Q1 2014)

IMS PROD

- 6 IMS members (4 Bank, 2 AG Insurance)
- 100% data sharing (Bank : 4,5 Tb DB2 ; 2,8 Tb IMS)
- Up to 50 M transactions / day
- Peak 1300 trx / s

Externalised Security system : RACF



Introduction

Objective

One model

Some tips



Security settings
at BNPPF



Baseline setup



Trigger



Implementation



Approach





Good practices



RECOMMENDED



BNP PARIBAS
PARTNERS FOR INNOVATION

A joint venture of BNP Paribas and IBM



Approach

Introduction
Baseline setup Trigger
Approach
Implementation
Follow-up
Summary

Involvement

Security parameters

Risk determination



Approach Involvement

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Management
System team
Security team
External partners



Approach

Security parameters : Where ?

- IMS System generation
- IMS PROCLIB
- IMS member Start
- Third party vendors
- IMS commands online

Overruled : document it + identical baseline value

Example : RACF Class suffix

- IMS System Generation
- IMS PROCLIB DFSDCxxx
- IMS PROCLIB DFSPBxxx ←





Approach

Security parameters : What ?



Risk based




Approach

Risk determination (highest to lowest)




Security checking



System (Un)availability



Single action failures



Others (traceability, 'do not'...)

Implementation

- Introduction
- Baseline setup
- Trigger Approach
- Implementation**
- Follow-up
- Summary

IMS Security Baseline document
IMS Security Parameter list
IMS Security Parameter examples
Validation



Implementation

IMS Baseline document

Definitions

Restrictions

Required approvals

Risk classification

IMS Baseline Parameter list

- Parameters + values + motivation

Parameter value change

Baseline change

Follow-up



Implementation

Security Parameter List

Identification		
Description		
Possible values		
Baseline value		
Baseline value motivation		
Value change validation (Actual value deviations from baseline value)		



Implementation

Examples (Very High Risk)

Source	Name	Purpose	Possible values	B V	Motivation	Change Validation
Proclib DFSPB id	OTMA SE	Defines the security verification method of commands or transactions of OTMA clients	C = Check F= Full (dependant region) N = None P = Profile (message)			Sec Coor DBMS ; Sec Coor MF
Proclib DFSDC id	MTOU SID	Specifies the userid for transaction authorisation when the MTO does not sign-on	userid			Sec Coor DBMS ; Sec Coor MF; Dom Arch DBMS



Implementation Examples (High Risk)

Source	Name	Purpose	Possible values	B V	Motivation	Change Validation
Proclib DFSPB id	DBRC NM	Identifies the DBRC address space	name			Dom Arch DBMS



Implementation Validation

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System team

Security team

'Industry' standard

Line management

Approval committees and/or senior management ?



Capture of actual settings

Periodic verification actual settings ↔ baseline settings

Periodic Reporting

Periodic review of IMS Security Baseline

Planning



Summary IMS Security Baseline

Involvement : system team, management, external

Catalogue and classify the (security) parameters

Life more easy afterwards

- Define restrictions
- Enforce identical values of (overruled) parameters

Motivation of the baseline value choice

Informed approval

We want IMS Security Baseline alive

- Periodic follow-up
- Include changes



Questions ?

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PS : 'Notes Body' contains extra information

